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6. Changing gender role attitudes1
Jacqueline Scott
In their introduction to the 1980 Women and Employment Survey, Martin
and Roberts (1984) state that the previous 20 years had seen an explosion
of interest in, and writings about, the changing roles of women. The
changes are well known. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s there had been
a signiﬁcant rise in the level of economic activity among women. Most of
the rise was accounted for by increasing proportions of mothers returning
to work after having children, and having less time out of the labour
market. In Britain many mothers throughout the latter part of the twenti-
eth century have worked part-time, although whether part-time work was
a matter of choice, or a matter of constraint, or some mixture of the two is
disputed.
Writing at the start of the 1990s, Witherspoon and Prior (1991) suggest
that there is clear evidence that women are the key advocates for change in
the gender division of labour. It seems hardly surprising that there is a sex
divide in terms of whether or not people favour a traditional gender divi-
sion of labour. It clearly works in men’s favour if women are both con-
tributing to the household income and maintaining their primary role for
care of the home and children. Yet, although the main focus of
Witherspoon and Prior is the attitudes of working-age women, they con-
clude that, without changes in men’s attitudes to care work, occupational
segregation based on gender is likely to continue.
There is no denying, however, that the male breadwinner system has been
in decline for at least half a century, not just in Britain but throughout
Europe. Between 1960 and 2003 women’s activity rates, relative to men’s
activity rates, increased from 44 to 79 per cent in the then 15 member coun-
tries of the European Union (EU) (McInnes 2006) whereas, as we illustrate
below, in Britain, between 1961 and 2001, the comparable increase is even
larger 43 to 84 per cent. The shift from male breadwinner and female carer
model to double-income and single-parent households have transformed
the established ways of distributing work between men and women. In
policy terms at least, women are no longer seen as being solely responsible
for family work and care. The expectation on the part of policy-makers
today is increasingly that women will be fully ‘individualised’, in the sense
156
SCOTT Ch.qxd  1/4/08  15:21  Page 156 Gary GARY'S G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's Jobs:11087 - EE 
of economically autonomous, although policies are often ambiguous on
this score (see Lewis, this volume). Social reality is more mixed; women are
still disproportionately in part-time work and still do the bulk of unpaid
care. Yet by the start of the twenty ﬁrst century the notion of work–life
balance (WLB) is ﬁrmly established in policy rhetoric. Why might this be? 
One possible explanation lies in the recent acceleration of attitudinal
changes regarding gender roles and the related shifts in the domestic divi-
sion of labour. A second explanation may lie in the concern that increased
employment participation of women may further negatively aﬀect fertility
rates in Europe where the population is rapidly ageing. There are also con-
cerns that the welfare of children themselves may suﬀer if mothers, like
fathers, spend increasing amounts of time at work. These practical con-
cerns play out against a strong ethos of gender equality, as represented in
equal opportunities legislation and practical progress in provision of
parental leave (including paternal leave) and childcare.
In this chapter I examine 25 year of attitudinal change in gender roles.
We know from previous research that attitudes have become steadily more
supportive of women’s dual work and family roles (Scott 1990; Scott et al.
1996). However, there is suggestion of a more recent backlash (for example,
Scott 1999). This might be triggered by rising unemployment, as in
Germany in the wake of reuniﬁcation (Braun et al. 1994), but it is also con-
ceivable that opinions may shift as the shine of the ‘super-mum’ syndrome
wears oﬀ, and the idea of women juggling high-powered careers while also
baking cookies and reading bedtime stories is increasingly seen to be unre-
alisable by ordinary mortals.
In Britain and cross-nationally there are time-series studies of represen-
tative population samples that allow us to examine attitude trends at the
aggregate level. Unfortunately, the interpretation of such trend data is
problematic because it is impossible empirically to disentangle whether
change is due to what are called ‘period’ eﬀects, or to the ageing process, or
to cohort eﬀects (Alwin and Scott 1996). However, strong theoretical con-
siderations can guide interpretation. Cohort eﬀects can change the overall
structure of attitudes as older generations, whose views were formed in a
diﬀerent era, die oﬀ and are replaced by younger ones with perhaps more
‘modern’ (egalitarian) attitudes. At the population level there have been
signiﬁcant changes over the past 25 years in employment behaviour and in
education, and both are likely to have a profound eﬀect on attitudinal shifts
across time.
The notion of a ‘rising tide’ of support for gender equality was coined
by Ingelhart and Norris (2003) who claim that the move towards greater
equality between men and women is part of a much broader dimension of
cultural change. However they also suggest that tides can ebb and ﬂow, and
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that government policies need the support of public opinion if they are not
to prove transient or even provoke a backlash. To what extent do people in
Britain and Europe support gender equality? Are there continuing con-
cerns about the impact of mother’s employment on the well-being of chil-
dren and family? Examining how Britain compares with other countries in
Europe, where policy initiatives for supporting motherhood and employ-
ment vary greatly, helps us identify in what ways Britain is distinctive.
CHANGES IN LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION
AND FAMILY LIFE
Just over half a century ago the 1949 Royal Commission on Population
report was concerned that the then existing employment bars against
married women working were harmful all round, to women, the family and
the community. True, the Commission was hardly giving a ringing endorse-
ment to working mothers. For example it observes that ‘there is often a real
conﬂict between motherhood and a whole-time career’ (ibid.: 160).
Nevertheless it went on to acknowledge that, at least in part, the conﬂict is
due to artiﬁcial barriers that restrict the contribution that women can make
to the cultural and economic life of the nation. The report urged that a
‘deliberate eﬀort should be made to devise adjustments that would render
it easier for women to combine motherhood and the care of a home with
outside activities’ (ibid.: 160).
Some 50 years later the BBC documentary series Panorama broadcast a
programme called ‘Back to the Kitchen’ (Powell 2000). Using analysis
based on data from the British Household Panel Study, a longitudinal study
that follows over 5000 households across time, the report stated that, within
just two years, one-third of women who had gone back to work full-time
following the birth of their ﬁrst child, had given up their full-time jobs, with
17 per cent switching to part-time work and 19 per cent giving up work alto-
gether. The report concludes with the assertion that British women feel
somewhat disillusioned and the promises to make work and motherhood
reconcilable have not materialised.
A premise that is shared by both the Royal Commission and the BBC
report is that there are distinctive sex- or gender-roles. In this chapter we
use the term gender-roles to acknowledge that existing norms concerning
male and female division of labour has as much or more to do with socio-
cultural inﬂuences, as biological diﬀerences. The traditional gender-role
divide is for the husband to be the breadwinner while the wife’s role is to
look after the home and children. This traditional gendered division of
labour was temporarily suspended during the Second World War when
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there were large-scale eﬀorts to make the mobilisation of married women
for the war eﬀort practicable on a national scale. War factories were moved
into areas where labour reserves were available; day nurseries were set up
and canteen services were organised; the provision of part-time jobs was
encouraged; the marriage bar for women in non-industrial occupations
including the civil service, the teaching profession, the police and the
London County Council was removed. The removal of the marriage bar
was enormously inﬂuential in opening up working opportunities for
women. But after the war many married women returned home, in part due
to the widespread sentiment that jobs ought to be ‘kept for the boys’ as
things got ‘back to normal’ (Myrdal and Kline 1956).
At the start of the new millennium, there was an understandable ten-
dency to focus on change. Duncan Gallie (2000), writing on labour force
change, notes that, while the overall labour force participation rate has been
remarkably stable across the twentieth century, this is because the declining
trend of men’s participation has been balanced by the increasing partici-
pation rates for women – especially married women. Here we update
Gallie’s table of labour force participation rates (in which ﬁgures are
adjusted to take account of the changes in mandatory school leaving age)
to include data from the 2001 Census (see Figure 6.1).
It can be seen that men’s participation rates have declined from 94 per
cent in 1911 through to 76 per cent in 2001. In contrast, women’s partici-
pation rates are continuing to rise. In 1911 just over a third of women
(35 per cent) were in the labour force; by 2001 this had risen to 64 per cent.
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Figure 6.1 Labour force participation rates in Great Britain, 1911–2001
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Whereas at the beginning of the century there was a 58 per cent diﬀerence
in the participation rates for men and women, by 2001 the diﬀerence is only
12 per cent.
The huge increase in women’s participation in the labour market is largely
reﬂected in the changes in the activity of married women. It can be seen that
participation rates for single women have been consistently high over the
twentieth century. In 1911, 69 per cent of all single women over compulsory
school age were economically active, whereas by 2001 this was the case for
62 per cent. In contrast, there has been a striking growth in the participa-
tion rates of married women. The 10 per cent jump between 1931 and 1951
is likely to reﬂect the war-time impact referred to above that legitimated a
role for women in employment. Facilitated by the collapse of the marriage
bar, the trend moved steadily upwards. Whereas in 1951 less than a quarter
of married women were in the work force, by 1991 this was the case for half
of all married women, and the proportion continued to rise in 2001 to 65
per cent, with the participation rate of married women, surpassing the rate
for single women. As Martin and Roberts (1984) noted about the early
1980s, marital status serves, in part, as a proxy for motherhood, and the
presence and age of children were crucial determinants of whether or not
women were employed.
Not surprisingly, the labour force participation of mothers varies greatly
with country, where policies diﬀer markedly in their support of working
mothers. Figure 6.2 shows the trends in labour force participations rates of
mother with children under 18 for Britain, West Germany, and the USA
(Alwin et al. 1996, updated). Britain is now very close to the USA in
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Source: The US data are from the US Department of Labor; the German data are from
Statistisches Bundesamt; the British ﬁgures come from ONS Social Trends, updated in 2004
using data from the British Household Panel Study.
Figure 6.2 Labour force participation rates of mothers with children under
18, by country 1940–2004
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participation rates, albeit with much higher rates of part-time work. West
Germany, prior to reuniﬁcation, had a strong male-breadwinner culture
that is now coming under question, with increasing concerns that the pop-
ularity of marriage and motherhood are being eroded.
There is a close association between the remarkable changes in labour
force participation and the dramatic changes in family life. In Britain, in
just one generation, the numbers marrying have halved, the numbers
divorcing have trebled and the proportion of children born outside mar-
riage has quadrupled (Pullinger and Summerﬁeld 1997). People are marry-
ing later and having fewer children than was the case in previous
generations. The average number of children in a family has declined from
2.0 in 1971 to 1.8 in 2004. In 2004 one in four dependent children lived with
a lone parent; whereas in 1972 it was only one child in 14. The rapid
increase in unmarried cohabitation is one of the most spectacular ways in
which traditional family life is changing in Britain (see Ermisch, this
volume). Living together before marriage is now the norm. Among women,
the proportion of those who cohabited with their future spouse prior to
marriage has risen from less than 4 per cent of those whose ﬁrst marriage
was in 1966 to 68 per cent of those who were married in 1993. By the 1990,
the vast majority of newly formed partnerships (over 70 per cent) were
cohabiting rather than legally married, although many of those in partner-
ships do go on to marry.
These changes in partnerships are likely to reﬂect and reinforce a fun-
damental shift in family values. It is not only perspectives on marriage and
the desirability of parenthood that have shifted but also attitudes con-
cerning appropriate gender-roles. While second-wave feminism, has
undoubtedly inﬂuenced both male and female conceptions of gender
equality, the timing is wrong for the 1970s feminist movement to be cred-
ited with the marked changes in women’s roles at work and in the home.
As we saw in Figure 6.1, women’s move into employment pre-dates second-
wave feminism. Women’s marked increase in labour force participation
throughout the second part of the twentieth century is not unique to
Britain. Throughout most industrial nations of the West, there has been a
huge rise in demand for labour, especially in service sectors where women
have traditionally been concentrated. As we saw, in the 1960s, most men
and a very substantial proportion of single women were already employed.
Thus increased labour market demands associated with expanding
economies helped draw married women, including those with dependent
children into the labour force.
The economic pressures on married women and mothers to be in paid work
have, if anything, increased. In Lisbon in March 2000 the heads of govern-
ment of the European Union subscribed to the very ambitious goal of raising
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the employment rate of both men and women by almost 10 percentage points
in less than 10 years. Across Europe as a whole, this goal can only be achieved
by the greater participation of women, with a target set for 60 per cent par-
ticipation by 2010 (Boeri et al. 2005). However, there is also some concern
that the increased labour force participation of women may further reduce
fertility rates in a Continent where the population is rapidly ageing (Esping-
Andersen 2005). More children are needed to ensure there are suﬃcient
workers to underwrite the growing welfare provision required for older
people. There is also concern about the welfare of children, and worries about
whether public childcare provision can substitute adequately for parental
(primarily maternal) care.
The UK has already surpassed the Lisbon target for a female labour
force participation rate of 60 per cent by 2010. However, there is little to be
complacent about. In Britain women’s participation in full-time employ-
ment has risen quite slowly. In 1951, 30 per cent of women aged 20–59 were
in full-time employment (Joshi 1989); 40 years later in 1991 this ﬁgure has
risen only slightly to 34 per cent. In the same period part-time work has
quintupled (from 5 per cent in 1951 to 26 per cent in 1991). In 2002, 70 per
cent of working age women were economically active with 42 per cent of
those in employment working part-time (WEU 2004). Whether women
chose to work part-time in order to juggle family and work roles, or whether
lack of childcare alternatives and a traditional gender-role division of
labour within the home leaves them no choice, is something that is far from
clear. What is clear is that part-time work still has disadvantages in pay and
promotion trajectories. How much impact the part-time work imperatives
that have attempted to reduce inequities in pay and conditions will have
remains to be seen but, as the Women and Work Commission Report
(2006) emphasised and the Equal Opportunities Commission survey on sex
and power (2007) highlights, there is little indication that, given current
rates of progress, gender inequalities in either pay or in representation in
top management positions will be eradicated in our lifetime.
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ATTITUDINAL CHANGE 
In this section I look at three aspects of gender-role change. First, I examine
the direction and extent of attitudinal change within the UK and I examine
whether there is any indication of a backlash. Second, I compare what is
known about attitudinal trends cross-nationally, in order to identify what
is distinctive about Britain and whether there has been a convergence
towards greater egalitarianism in attitudes across Europe and the USA.
Third, I explore how far the diﬀerent theoretical explanations of social
162 Dynamics of employment and family
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change in attitudes towards gender egalitarianism are or are not supported,
in Great Britain, West Germany, and the USA.
On each of these issues, there is a considerable amount of previous
research that informs our understanding about gender role change. However,
what is new in this chapter is, ﬁrst, that I extend the information about atti-
tudinal change in the UK through into the new millennium. Second, new data
from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on gender-role
changes allow us to compare the speed and direction of attitudinal change
across time for seven diﬀerent countries (West Germany, Great Britain, the
USA, the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland and Spain). Third, the ISSP data pro-
vides a suﬃcient time span (14 years, with surveys in 1988, 1994 and 2002) for
the systematic investigation of the underlying causes of attitudinal change.
Attitudinal Changes in Great Britain
Trend data from Britain are available from the early 1980s. In 1980, the
Women and Employment Survey asked a series of questions about women’s
roles and some items have been replicated later in the British Social
Attitudes Surveys through to 2002. Table 6.1 shows the percentage of men
and women taking an egalitarian stance on each of several questions which
are grouped together as concerning various nurturant or instrumental roles
for women. These labels come from the inﬂuential book of Parsons and
Bales (1955), where they suggested that the diﬀerentiation of sex-roles
within the family along the instrumental-expressive lines embodies the
social, as distinct from the purely reproductive, diﬀerentiation of sex-roles.
Here I am mainly concerned to trace how far there remains support for the
notion of a distinctive gender division of labour whereby women are seen
as mainly responsible for family care and men for the breadwinning role.
The use of the term ‘egalitarian’ signiﬁes support for the feminist position
that favours women’s economic independence.
Nurturant items include measures that raise the issue of whether mater-
nal employment is harmful to children or families. These consist of four
items asking for people’s views about whether a woman and her family will
be happier if she goes out to work; whether family life suﬀers if the woman
works full-time; whether a pre-school child is likely to suﬀer if his or her
mother works; and whether a working mother can establish as warm and
secure a relationship with her children, as a mother who does not work.
Instrumental items tap agreement with traditional gender-role ideology and
attitudes about women’s jobs, and asks about whether a job is all right, but
what most women really want is a home and children; whether a husband’s
job is to earn the money and a wife’s job is to take care of the children;
whether having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent
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person; and whether both the husband and wife should contribute to the
household income.
We can see from the top half of Table 6.1, which shows the items con-
cerned with women’s nurturant role, that there is very low support for the
notion that a woman and family will all be happier if she goes out to work.
However, this item is clearly ambiguous and the respondent has no ade-
quate response option if they feel that women and family interests may be
diﬀerent. Regarding whether pre-school children suﬀer if mothers work,
there is a quite pronounced gender diﬀerence with the time trend showing
more people rejecting this through to the mid-1990s and then little or no
change. A similar pattern holds true for views as to whether family life
suﬀers if women go out to work, with the same slowing down or even rever-
sal of egalitarian positions. The view that working mothers can achieve as
good a relationship with children as mums who are not employed is
endorsed more by women than men (71 per cent v. 60 per cent in 2002), with
both male and female views moving in a more egalitarian direction, over
time.
Regarding instrumental roles, the notion that what women really want is
a home and children is rejected more by women than men. While only a
third of women rejected this view in 1980 this rose to almost half the pop-
ulation taking the egalitarian stance by the end of the 1980s and attitudes
remained quite stable through the 1990s. Women are also more likely to
reject the notion there should be a gender-role divide and there has been a
clear increase in both men and women’s egalitarianism over time. The
notion that a job is a best way to achieve independence shows very little
gender diﬀerence, and both men and women’s agreement with this view has
declined over time. Support for dual-earners started out with women more
in favour than men but, since the mid-1990s, men are as likely or even more
likely to support two-earner households as are women.
It is not an exciting story. We ﬁnd that the British, in the early 1980s are
fairly conservative. There is one exception – the quite high proportion who
believed that a job is the best way for a woman to be independent. There
has been some shift towards greater egalitarianism on both nurturant and
instrumental roles. However, there is also some evidence of a retreat with
mounting concerns about whether family life suﬀers and increasing doubts
about whether jobs allow women to be independent. It is only a small
minority who are sanguine about whether women and families are happier
if the woman has a job. As expected, we ﬁnd that women tend to be more
egalitarian than men on most items, with the one exception being support
for dual-earners where men are marginally more in favour than women.
The change over two decades has been much slower and more uneven than
those who represent the story as one of revolutionary change followed by
166 Dynamics of employment and family
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backlash would like us to believe. Of course, there may have been a marked
change in gender-role attitudes before 1980. Nevertheless attitudinal
change on most items over the past two decades has been surprisingly
modest. In the next section we examine how far Britain is distinctive in this
respect, in comparison other Western industrial countries.
Attitudinal change across nations and time
Seven of the eight attitudinal items shown in Table 6.1 have also been
carried in the International Social Survey Programme modules on family
and gender-role change that took place in 1988 (or 1989 in Great Britain),
1994 and 2002. The ambiguous question about women and families all
being happier was dropped. In Table 6.2 we can see the attitudinal changes
across time in seven countries: West Germany, Great Britain, the USA,2
Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain. Unfortunately, in both Italy and
Spain survey participation was only for two of the three waves, with Italy
not participating in 2002 and Spain not participating in 1988. The per-
centages reﬂect the combined attitudes of men and women, although sep-
arate analysis (not shown) shows that in all countries women tend to be
somewhat more egalitarian than men on most items.
Regarding people’s views about whether pre-school children suﬀer if their
mother works, it can be seen that Ireland is the most egalitarian of these
countries, with Great Britain next. Opinion in the USA is becoming more
concerned about the negative consequences that women’s work may have on
the children. By contrast, the relatively positive views about the warmth of
the working mother’s maternal relationship have levelled oﬀ in both Ireland
and the Netherlands, whereas in Great Britain and the USA attitudes have
become more positive over time. However, there is some evidence of a retreat
from egalitarianism in terms of rising concern that family life suﬀers if the
woman has a full-time job, in both the USA and Great Britain. In views con-
cerning the instrumental role of women, the West Germans are now the
most egalitarian of these countries in rejecting the notion that what women
really want is a home and job. However, there has been some reversal of sen-
timent in the UA, Great Britain and the Netherlands. On the item that taps
support for traditional gender-role ideology, it is only in the UA that there
is any indication of a fall in support for gender egalitarianism. West
Germany is moving in a markedly more egalitarian direction across time,
with shifts towards greater egalitarianism in both Ireland and Spain. It is
interesting that two predominantly Catholic countries are among the
least traditional of these seven countries on this measure. There is a very
substantial cross-national diﬀerence in attitudes regarding whether both
men and women should contribute to the household income with Spain
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being the most in favour of dual-earner households and the Netherlands
the least.
So what does this cross-national comparison reveal? Gender-role atti-
tudes diﬀer considerably, depending on the issue, but the notion that there
has been a steady increase in favour of women’s instrumental roles and a
move away from positions that endorse women’s primary nurturant respon-
sibilities is a myth. Particularly on those issues that best tap mounting con-
cerns about work–family balance there is clear indication that women’s
changing role is viewed as having costs both for the woman and for family.
Nevertheless there is little evidence to support those who talk of gender-
role backlash. Although, it could be argued that countries are at a diﬀerent
point in a cycle of attitudinal change. For most countries, attitudes were
more conservative in the 1980s than in the subsequent decades. However, it
may be that the shift from a conservative to a more egalitarian position
reaches a peak followed by a retreat. The USA may be more advanced in
the cycle than other countries, in showing retreat or greater awareness of
potential conﬂicts between women’s labour force participation and family
life. By contrast, West Germany shows an increase in egalitarianism on
most items, albeit starting from a rather traditional stance. In Great
Britain, change over time has been relatively modest on most items.
The diﬀerent trajectories and speed of change in the diﬀerent countries
begs for further analysis of the underlying drivers of social change. There
has been a wealth of theoretical and empirical work, particularly in the
USA, which has highlighted potential factors that inﬂuence social change
in this area, including generational or birth cohort eﬀects, educational
advances, changes in women’s labour force participation, changes in part-
nership formation, diﬀerent religious traditions, and increasing secularisa-
tion (for example, Bumpass 1990; Mason and Lu 1988; Thornton et al.
1983). In the next section we put some of the competing explanations of
social change in gender role attitudes to the test, by analysing the predic-
tors of such change in Great Britain, the USA and West Germany.
What are the Drivers of Attitudinal Change? 
By comparing the drivers of attitudinal change in Great Britain, West
Germany and the USA, we can see whether the underlying factors of
change are similar or very diﬀerent in these three nations. In order to
examine gender-role change, we use a summary measure of gender role atti-
tudes. The summary item adds together the three nurturant measures
shown in Table 6.2, together with three of the instrumental measures. Thus
this summary measures adds six binary scores, giving a range of zero
through six, with higher scores indicating greater egalitarian consistency.
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The item concerning a job being the best way for a woman to be independ-
ent is dropped in order to improve the internal reliability of the new
summary measure, in all three nations. The chronbach alphas are .70 for
Great Britain, .71 for West Germany and .72 for the USA. In our analysis
we drop the small number of cases where there are missing data on more
than three of the items.
The predictor variables are cohort, year of survey, highest education;
employment status of the female respondent or male respondent’s female
partner/wife; marital status; religion; and church attendance. A form of
dummy regression, multiple classiﬁcation analysis (MCA), is used to show
the deviations of each category from the grand mean adjusted for the
eﬀects of the other variables included in the model. As Table 6.3 shows clear
patterns emerge regarding gender role change in the three countries. First,
it is worth noting that women have more egalitarian sympathies than do
men in all three countries; respective grand means are 2.66 (female) versus
2.44 (males) in West Germany; 3.32 (females) versus 2.89 (males) in Great
Britain, and 3.24 (females) versus 2.71 (males) in the USA. Thus Great
Britain is marginally the most egalitarian country on this measure and West
Germany the least. The most important predictor of gender-role attitudes
in all three countries is cohort (etas, a correlation ratio, shows the strength
of relationship) although for men in Great Britain having a partner who
works (full-time or part-time), rather than a home-maker is also a strong
predictor.
Figure 6.3 shows the adjusted mean scores by cohort on gender role atti-
tudes for men and women in the three nations. Women from Great Britain
and the USA tend to be the most egalitarian. The adjusted mean scores
associated with the year of survey diﬀer quite substantially between coun-
tries, as Figure 6.4 makes clear. In West Germany attitudes have become
increasingly egalitarian over time, for both men and women, albeit from a
lower base point than the other two countries. In Great Britain, there has
been little shift in attitudes over the 14 years, although women’s attitudes in
2002 are, if anything, less egalitarian than in 1988 on this summary measure.
In the USA there is evidence that egalitarianism had peaked by the end of
the 1980s and recent years have seen a retreat, with both men and women’s
attitudes becoming markedly less egalitarian in the new millennium.
In Table 6.3 it can be seen that education is a signiﬁcant predictor of
gender-role attitudes, except for British men. In addition, women’s work
status is particularly inﬂuential for women’s attitudes in all countries.
Without panel data that follows the same individuals across time, it is not
possible to disentangle whether women with more egalitarian views are
more likely to obtain employment, whether employment experience encour-
ages more egalitarian attitudes, or whether both are true.
170 Dynamics of employment and family
SCOTT Ch.qxd  1/4/08  15:21  Page 170 Gary GARY'S G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's Jobs:11087 - EE 
However, we are able to estimate how far cohort eﬀects can be ‘explained’
by diﬀerences in education and work status. In analysis (not shown) we ran
three MCA models, the ﬁrst estimating the eﬀect of cohort and year alone;
a second that included cohort, year, education and work status; and a third
model, with the additional variables of marital status, religion and church
attendance corresponding to Table 6.3. Interestingly, cohort eﬀects are not
reduced or ‘explained’ by the introduction of controls for education and
labour force participation. Perhaps this is not surprising as, by 1988, the
rapid rise of women’s education and labour force participation had already
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Figure 6.3 Cohort eﬀects on gender-role attitudes, by country and gender
Figure 6.4 Year eﬀects on gender-role attitudes, by country and gender
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Table 6.3 Predictors of gender-role attitudinal change: WG, GB and USA
Women Men
WG GB USA WG GB USA
Deviation from mean (adj)
Cohort Through 1920 0.68 1.1 0.92 0.56 0.76 1
1921–30 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.42 0.65 0.39
1931–40 0.15 0.55 0.01 0.42 0.29 0.4
1941–50 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.08
1951–60 0.29 0.34 0.18 0.28 0.15 0.24
1961–70 0.36 0.3 0.34 0.45 0.26 0.33
1971& after 0.38 0.57 0.54 0.19 0.78 0.38
Eta 0.41*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.24***
Year 1988 0.32 0.03 0.16 0.32 0.07 0.22
1994 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.11
2002 0.72 0.06 0.35 0.51 0.08 0.4
Eta 0.25*** 0.08ns 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.12** 0.09***
Education Below 2ndry 0.28 0.13 0.38 0.25 0.06 0.22
2ndry complete 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.13
High sch dip 0.25 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.04
College 0.64 0.27 0.3 0.42 0.05 0.23
Eta 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.2*** 0.16*** 0.12ns 0.13**
Women’s Workg (ft/pt) 0.442 0.28 0.29 0.53 0.4 0.14
work Home-maker 0.39 0.83 0.66 0.32 0.89 0.73
Other/no wife 0.04 0.012 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.14
Eta 0.38*** 0.3*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.19***
Marital Married 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.1 0.08
status Prev married 0.05 0.19 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.18
Never married 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.16 0.26 0.04
Eta 0.26* 0.11bs 0.17*** 0.20** 0.09* 0.13ns
Religion Cath 0.05 0 0.08 0.06 0.26 0.01
Prots 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.03
Other 0.31 0.24 0.14 0.67 0.35 0.04
None 0.11 0.14 0.22 0.24 0.09 0.09
Eta 0.16*** 0.15* 0.07ns 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.08ns
Church Weekly 0.26 0.11 0.22 0.26 0.34 0.22
attend Sev month 0.04 0.02 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.11
Less freq 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.13 0.16
Never 0.23 0.02 0.21 0.24 0.09 0.07
Eta 0.27*** 0.1ns 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.14* 0.11**
Grand 2.66 3.32 3.24 2.44 2.89 2.71
mean
N 3216 2257 2290 2876 1919 1670
R square 0.29 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.12
Notes:
* p .05 ** p .01 *** p .001
nsnot signiﬁcant. bsborderline signiﬁcant p .10.
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occurred. Controlling for other factors (marital status, religion and church
attendance) also does not change the basic ﬁnding that most of the varia-
tion that we can explain is attributable to cohort eﬀects and the amount of
such cohort variation that is due to diﬀerent patterns of education and
work or religiosity across cohorts is negligible. Nevertheless, in all countries
and for both genders the explained variance does increase as education,
marital status and religion are introduced into the models. As Table 6.3
shows, the total variance explained in the summary measure of gender role
attitudes is highest in West Germany (22 per cent for men and 29 per cent
for women) and markedly lower in both Great Britain and the USA (16 per
cent GB men, 12 per cent US men, and 18 per cent for women in both coun-
tries). Thus the model works best in West Germany, where attitudinal shifts
have been catching up with the egalitarianism that seems to have peaked
earlier in other countries.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter we have looked at three aspects of gender role change. First
we investigated the extent of attitudinal change within Great Britain and
considered whether or not there is evidence of a backlash. Second we com-
pared what is known about attitudinal change cross-nationally to ﬁnd out
what is distinctive about Britain and whether there has been any conver-
gence of attitudes in Europe and the USA. Finally, we explored empiri-
cally various explanations of social attitudinal change, in particular we
wanted to ﬁnd out to what extent generational diﬀerences are the main
drivers of attitudinal change and, if so, whether such diﬀerences are
reduced once education and labour force participation are taken into
account.
We found that gender-role attitudinal change in Britain does not support
a story of revolutionary change and backlash. Interestingly, however, we do
ﬁnd that gender attitudes seem to follow a cyclical period of change, showing
a move towards greater egalitarianism followed by retreat. Of course, the fact
that people’s attitudes have changed relatively slowly and inconsistently does
not provide any direct evidence about behaviour. However, attitudes do
matter and women (and particularly mothers) can experience considerable
strain when attitudes reinforce the notion that employment and family inter-
ests conﬂict. There is considerable commitment to the traditional gender-role
divide and there remains concern that maternal employment may compro-
mise family and child well-being. (For similar observations regarding trends
in USA, see Thornton and De Marco 2001.)
In terms of our cross-national comparison of gender-role change, we
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found attitudes diﬀer considerably depending on the issue. However, the
idea that there is near universal support for egalitarianism is clearly a myth.
Interestingly, there is evidence of mounting concern about work–family
balance on items which tap the conﬂicts that employment and family care
raise for women. There is also clear evidence that countries diﬀer markedly
in terms of their trajectories and speed of change in a way that begs add-
itional analysis to improve our understanding of what is driving attitudinal
change.
In this chapter we limited out exploration of the drivers of attitudinal
change to three countries: West Germany, Great Britain and the USA. We
found that the dominant predictor of gender-role attitudes is generation or
birth cohort. Moreover, the importance of generation remains, even when
controlling for diﬀerences in education, women’s labour force participation
and religion. For the most part our societies are moving towards an epoch
of equalisation in terms of opportunities and constraints on men and
women. However, in gender-role attitudes there is some evidence of egali-
tarianism reaching a peak and retreat, particularly in the USA. Moreover,
there is still a pronounced generational lag in support for more egalitarian
gender roles. It is perhaps not surprising that ‘old-fashioned’ notions of
gender diﬀerence are proving surprisingly resilient, given that new gender
equalities have imposed a double burden on women, whose employment
status does little to ease their burden of family care.
Is the new millennium going to bring further progress or retreat in
gender-role egalitarianism? To answer this question we need to do a better
job in monitoring gender-role attitudinal change than is currently the case.
The existing questions are relatively crude indicators for preferences con-
cerning the complex ways men and women can divide up paid and unpaid
labour (see Braun 2007). Existing surveys contain little information about
men’s roles outside of paid work. We need to explore the disjuncture
between practice and expectations concerning work and family life, which
have challenged both men and women over the last few decades. Are
people concerned about the potential negative eﬀects of maternal
employment, because caring is seen as predominantly woman’s work, or is
it because there are no practical alternatives to the woman being the
primary carer? Is it primarily men who must change in their contribution
to unpaid care or will greater egalitarianism be achieved more readily by
the increasing commodiﬁcation of care? Existing measures are designed to
tap support or rejection of the traditional gender-role divide. But the inter-
esting issues are now about how men and women can best work together
to achieve a work–family balance that meets the needs of diﬀerent gener-
ations, at diﬀerent stages of the life course. To make progress in devising
egalitarian interventions that the public would support, we need to know
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more about what gender-roles people view as practical, as possible, and as
fair.
NOTES
1. I gratefully acknowledge support for this research from a grant by the Economic and
Social Research Council (RES–225-25-1001).
2. The 2002 data for the USA are not strictly comparable with early time-points because the
response categories changed.
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